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Abstract 
 
Neoclassical economic theory has long been scrutinized for its failure to be 
congruent with reality, often lacking generality and tractability due to, what many critics 
argue to be, unrealistic assumptions. One of the theory’s core suppositions is a 
representative “rational agent” or homo economicus, whose self-interest and optimal 
choices, which are in state of equilibrium and efficiency are rooted in utility 
maximization of his well-being. Even though neoclassical economics claims to accurately 
depict human nature, from its very inception it has failed to incorporate human 
psychology and sociology into its foundations. As the behavioral and biological research 
became more robust in the 20th and 21st centuries, it began to provide evidence against 
some of theory’s core questionable and often unsubstantiated claims. The paper intends 
to demonstrate a flaw in the “human rationality” assumption of the standard economic 
theory by exploring the phenomenon of addiction as one of the akratic behaviors that is 
often exhibited by human beings in the real world. This paper will focus on providing a 
brief overview and juxtaposition the Rational Choice and Rational Addiction models 
against assumptions and conclusions of the “picoeconomic” approach to explore the 
concepts of rational versus akratic behaviors in an attempt to evaluate whether these 
theories are capable of systematically explaining addictive tendencies of an “economic 
man.” 
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 1 
Chapter One: Introduction 
The definition and the scope of economics as a social science discipline have been 
evolving since the time of what is, stereotypically, considered to be its official inception, 
i.e. in the works of Adam Smith. In its initial iterations, economic behavior was 
frequently viewed within a social context with a particular emphasis on production, 
distribution and consumption of wealth; however, the economic inquiry experienced a 
shift to a microeconomic level with the rise of neoclassical economic theory, with a 
particular accent on the study of “man” and his role in economic activity. Lionel Robbins 
developed a definition that is commonly accepted stating that “economics is a science 
which studies human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means which 
have alternative uses.” This definition allowed economists to expand their grasp beyond 
discipline’s standard scope and promote interest in analysis of any type of behavior 
influenced by scarcity.1 Its proponents argue that the economic method is capable of 
being utilized in studying what we would not typically perceive as economic aspects of 
life, such as politics, sociology, religion, law and general human behavior. Through 
“economic imperialism,” all areas of life can be analyzed within the context of primary 
standard economic theory axioms, including stable preferences, utility maximizing 
                                                 
1 Backhouse, R., and Medema, S. (2009). "Retrospectives: On the Definition of Economics", Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 23(1), p. 225.  
2 
behavior and market equilibrium.2 However, neoclassical economic theory and its core 
assumptions have long been scrutinized for their failure to acknowledge and incorporate 
approaches and discoveries from other disciplines such as psychology, sociology, 
philosophy as well as natural sciences.3 One of such core assumptions is the ubiquitous 
yet contentious concept of rationality, which permeates interests, discussions and theories 
of social scientists and philosophers alike. This paper will specifically address and 
critique this important assumption of the standard microeconomic theory of consumer 
choice and decision-making.4 Particular focus will be given to rational choice theory and 
its ability to explain the phenomenon of akrasia. Akratic behavior can be observed in 
individuals with self-harming habitual behaviors, including, but not limited to, behavioral 
and substance addictions. The development and perpetuation of addictive or compulsive 
behavioral and consumption patterns that can affect both short-term and long-term well-
being, problems of self-control and relapse, are considered some of the most relevant and 
complex issues sought to be addressed by social and biological sciences. From mere 
observation of such issues, which most people (without the necessity for complex 
analytical inquiry) would consider the opposite of “rational,” should induce us to 
question the standard theory’s core assumptions about the “man” whose behavior it seeks 
to predict. The paper questions the idea of a utility maximizing rational agent embodied 
within the conception of homo economicus. The paper attempts to do this by considering 
                                                 
2 Cowen, T. (2001). “How Do Economists Think About Rationality?” 
https://www.gmu.edu/centers/publicchoice/faculty%20pages/Tyler/rationality.pdf (accessed February 10, 
2016). 
 
3 Not counting the inclination of early neoclassical economists, such as Alfred Marshal, Léon Walras and 
Francis Edgeworth, to construct theories based on mid-19th century physics and mathematics. 
 
4 I also recognize the importance of this assumption as it is applied to the neoclassical macroeconomic 
modeling and policy conclusions. 
3 
the self-defeating akratic behavior such as addiction, which is generally perceived as a 
negative behavior that is harmful (to self and others) and irrational in nature. The paper 
consequently questions whether or not neoclassical economic theory has the capacity to 
explain the “addiction” phenomenon, as it does through a framework of rational addiction 
theory, which, in itself, is a clear manifestation of “economic imperialism.” I will argue 
that a different approach, hyperbolic discounting, as it is utilized by a subfield of 
behavioral economics based on experimental discovery known as “picoeconomics,” 
while grounded within an economic theory framework, can provide several important 
insights into akratic behavioral phenomenon; it offers a more accurate foundation for 
analysis of addictive behaviors while filling in or replacing some of the gaps of the 
standard economic model. The paper also identifies some disadvantages of using the 
picoeconomic approach as the sole method of explanation of addictive behavior. I posit 
that no singular model has the capacity to fully quantify and predict human behavior due 
to the sheer complexity of the Homo sapiens. The paper does not address the following 
topics in detail, although I recognize their importance to the specific question as well as 
the overall argument: in-depth details, discussion and critique of behavioral economic 
theory origin and methods; emerging field of neuroeconomics and evolutionary biology 
and psychology; in-depth psychological and physiological foundations of addictive and 
compulsive behaviors; implications of behavioral and economic research for public 
health policies; a thorough and comprehensive overview of philosophical theories, 
specifically concerning the theories of rationality, free will, willpower, identity, self, 
judgement and morality. The paper intends to 1) explore the flaw in neoclassical theory’s 
assumption of “rational behavior” as a given, with an overly simplistic and incomplete 
4 
view of human nature, as demonstrated in its attempt to tackle such a complex 
psychological and socioeconomic problem as addiction; 2) present an alternative 
framework of why akratic behavior exists through a model of hyperbolic discounting 
within picoeconomic literature, which attempts to blend both economic and 
psychological (and to, some extent, philosophical and metaphysical) considerations. 
Since the subsequent discussion intends to look at the interaction of rationality, 
akrasia and addiction, I first must present a general definition and description of each: 
Rationality 
Assumptions about rationality place a central role in all fields of inquiry that 
observe and study human behavior. Individuals within the modern western society can 
generally discern and, in majority, agree what constitutes “rational” or “irrational” 
behavior; however, in many cases, that which constitutes a rational thought or action 
should be viewed as subjective. The term "rationality" tends to be used differently across 
disciplines, including specialized discussions of economics, sociology, psychology, 
philosophy, evolutionary biology and political science.  In economic theorists’ views, 
economic rationality is regarded in an instrumental sense, in which thought or action are 
means to achieve given ends within the most efficient manner; i.e. reason is a tool to 
reach goals. Philosophers, on the other hand, view rationality through a myriad of lenses 
and separate it into concepts that include “practical reasoning, procedural rationality and 
expressive rationality.”5 In certain instances, philosophers explore a dichotomy between 
rationality and reason, e.g. humans, by nature, are not rational creatures, but are capable 
of using reason as a psychological faculty to discern between the degree of 
                                                 
5 Cowen, p. 1. 
5 
practicality/rationality of their thoughts and actions. It is agreed that “rationality” does 
not have one consistent definition.6 For example, one view of rationality is the notion that 
if an action, belief, or desire is rational we ought to choose it.7 This presents rationality as 
a normative concept, in a philosophical sense, as it refers to the conformity of one's 
beliefs with one's reasons to believe, or of one's actions with one's reasons for action: a 
rational decision is one that is not just reasoned, but is also optimal for achieving a goal 
or solving a problem. It is assumed that each individual is entitled to her own preferences, 
but that those should adhere to “basic rules of logic and probability theory” and should 
not change due to subjective factors such as mood or context. 8 In this interpretation, it is 
fairly simple to transfer the behavior of a homo economicus within a market place, 
bargaining or competing with or for things of tangible value such as money, and include 
other “goods” that present subjective value in the form of satisfaction or utility, concepts 
to be elaborated on in subsequent chapter. Despite its general focus on behavioral 
consistency, the rationality assumption can be perceived as an intuitive concept, i.e. 
human beings can frequently discern what we, collectively, would perceive as a 
“rational” versus “irrational” decision.  
Social scientists have long held the rationality assumption as a given in modeling 
and predicting human behavior; there is not an argument amongst them that people have 
motivations and use reason to pursue their goals, whether these goals are chosen 
“rationally” or “irrationally.” Irrational behavior in itself requires the use of thought and 
                                                 
6 Shafir, E., & LeBoeuf, R. A. (2002). Rationality. Annual Review of Psychology, 53(1), 491-517. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.53.100901.135213 
 
7 Audi, R. (1999). The Cambridge dictionary of philosophy (2nd;2;ed.). Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
8 Shafir, p. 493. 
6 
reasoning. Sigmund Freud insisted that what one might perceive as madness and 
irrational choice in the long-run, can be interpreted as a patient’s solution to a particular 
problem.9 The difference in how, for example, the economic and psychological 
disciplines differ in their approach to the concept of “rationality” lies in viewing behavior 
in context of “givens” or how the behavior is framed: “in economics, rationality is 
viewed in terms of the choices it produces; in other social sciences, it is viewed in terms 
of processes it employs.”10 Economic rationality is depicted as a logical process, not a 
psychological phenomenon. It does not factor in emotions: emotions and desires are 
foundations of choice, but they do not explain why a certain choice was made; within the 
economic context, feelings are givens and are not evaluated based on whether or not they 
promote the best course of action. The self-interest standard of rationality maintains that 
rational people consider only costs and benefits that amass directly to themselves.  Such a 
standard stipulates that rational people act efficiently in pursuit of whatever objectives 
they hold at the moment of choice. Economic rationality, based on the neoclassical 
model, is, therefore, an agent’s consistency within preferences and beliefs while in 
command of full information and awareness of consequences. It is economically rational 
to achieve the end-result with given means based on a certain desire; if the goal is 
achieved, then the process itself is rational; the quality or “rationality” of the result is not 
judged. However, as will be discussed in later chapters, some of the core foundations of 
                                                 
9 Simon, H. A. (1986). Rationality in psychology and economics. The Journal of Business, 59(4), p. 209. 
doi:10.1086/296363 
 
10 Ibid. 
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economic rationality are not necessarily supported by qualitative and quantitative 
evidence.11 
Akrasia 
Akrasia, a term that can be traced back to classical Greek philosophers and is 
literally translated as “lack of mastery”, can be interpreted as “human beings acting 
against their own better judgement.” Akrasia demonstrates a deviation from assumption 
of prevalent human rationality as an akratic person goes against reason as a result of 
“pathos” or emotion. Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of akrasia: impetuosity and 
weakness. An impulsive individual acts first under influence of a strong emotion, only to 
regret an action later. A weak individual takes time to make a deliberate choice, but 
rather than go with a reasoned choose to act under the influence of a passion. Aristotle 
separates causes of akrasia into appetite for pleasure and anger, in part influenced by 
Plato’s tripartite division of the soul in the Republic. Plato stipulated that “spirited part” 
or the “appetitive part” can sway an individual away from a reasoned choice and action. 
One other interpretation of Aristotle’s treatment of akrasia is similar to that put forth by 
Socrates: akrasia is ignorance. Those who possess “practical wisdom” also possess 
“ethical virtues” which require complete emotional mastery. “Anger and appetite are 
fully in harmony with reason, if one is practically wise, and so this intellectual virtue is 
incompatible with the sort of inner conflict experienced by the akratic person.”12   
                                                 
11 Cowen also states that there “no single, monolithic economic method or approach to rationality,” 
meaning that, as different economic perspectives evolved, the concept evolves simultaneously (often 
allowing for the a particular economic perspective and respective models to be plausible).  
 
12 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/ (accessed December 24th, 2015.) 
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  Much of philosophical and psychological literature ties akratic behavior to the 
weakness of the will. Some modern scholars have elaborated further on ideas put forth by 
Plato, Socrates and Aristotle to include notions of individuals temporarily changing 
beliefs and preferences, exhibiting a breakdown of originally preferred action and a 
conflict of motivational states. Others have taken a more simplistic interpretation that 
views akratic behavior as a result of people merely seeking pleasure with an intent to 
delay painful or costly experience. For example, procrastination can be explained as 
simply a preference for immediate gratification while putting off of an unpleasant task 
until later. We may be fully aware that the feeling of regret will eventually come and that 
from, a global perspective, the current choice is not practical, but nonetheless choose the 
option that, in the moment, is most pleasing.13 Akratic behavior, in itself, should 
challenge the economic notion of rationality where a rational human being consistently 
desires to maximize her short-term and long-term well-being (or minimize harm); how is 
it, even with full awareness of possible negative consequences, our decisions seem 
change and induce us to continue making choices that we know are causing self-harm or 
harm to others? 
Addiction 
Addiction can certainly be classified as a type of “akratic” behavior. The original 
definition of addiction as “judicial enslavement,” or sentenced to serve another, may be 
even more helpful in tying it to concepts of akrasia and rationality14. An addicted 
individual voluntarily chooses to be “enslaved” by her addiction. The idea of “addiction” 
                                                 
13 This challenges the economic concept of “maximization.” 
 
14 Simpson, J. A., Weiner, E. S. C., & Oxford University Press. (1989). The Oxford English Dictionary 
(2nd ed.). Oxford; Oxford University Press; Clarendon Press. 
9 
or someone being “addicted” typically has negative connotations. Generally, it produces 
images of downtrodden drug users who are spiraling out of control, as they become 
“enslaved” by the disease through a state of constantly seeking reinforcing and rewarding 
stimuli. The American Psychiatric Association and Diagnostic Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders definition of addiction primarily focuses on the “substance abuse” 
aspects of the condition and views it is as a chronic brain disease that causes compulsive 
substance use despite harmful consequences. Addiction is defined as a maladaptive 
pattern of substance use and a disorder of the brain’s reward system leading to clinically 
significant impairment or distress, as manifested by three (or more) of the following, 
occurring any time in the same 12-month period: tolerance, withdrawal, difficulty 
controlling in use, negative consequences, spending significant time or emotional energy, 
desire to cut down.15  Roots of addiction often lie in both “nature” and “nurture” of an 
addicted individual, i.e. both genetics and the environment, such as peer pressure, 
socioeconomic and family circumstances, play a role. However, the primary emphasis in 
the mainstream definition of addiction is the view that it is a “chronic, relapsing disease” 
that primarily stems from biology: neurotransmitter dopamine is the primary factor that is 
responsible for substance abuse.16  
The only behavioral addiction currently recognized by the DSM-5 is gambling 
addiction. However, the word “addiction” is often used colloquially to apply to any 
favored good or activity that has the potential to be overconsumed:  cocaine, sex, sweets 
                                                 
15 Winter, H. (2011). The economics of excess: Addiction, indulgence, and social policy. Stanford, 
California: Stanford Economics and Finance, an imprint of Stanford University Press. 
 
16 American Psychiatric Association, http://psychiatry.org/patients-families/addiction/what-is-addiction  
(accessed December 26, 2015). 
10 
or Netflix shows can all be grouped into the same category as humans can develop a 
tendency to binge on these and experience a certain level of regret. Therefore, for the 
purpose of this paper’s discussion, I intend to define and refer to addiction in broader 
terms: addiction is a condition that results when a person ingests a substance (e.g., 
alcohol, cocaine, nicotine) or engages in an activity (e.g., gambling, sex, shopping) that 
can be pleasurable, but the continued use/act of which becomes compulsive, interferes 
with ordinary life responsibilities, such as work, relationships, or health and results in 
regret and self-reported inability to stop. It is also plausible that individuals may not be 
aware or may be in denial about the fact that their behavior is out of control and is 
causing problems for themselves and others.17  
The current psychiatric definition of addiction, which emphasizes the role of 
neurotransmitter function and pathway, has come under scrutiny. For example, it can be 
said that all activities, in some form, elevate the dopamine release system. If it is 
stipulated that dopamine elevation is the primary and necessary condition for addiction, 
then other non-addictive substances or activities that are part of a healthy life would 
unnecessarily be grouped under this definition. In Addiction, a Disorder of Choice, Gene 
Heyman argues that current research does not support the general perception that 
addiction is purely rooted in biology and should be treated as a chronic physiological 
disease as, for example, diabetes and schizophrenia. He notes that of all psychiatric 
conditions, addiction has one of the highest remission rates and most recoveries are done 
without medical intervention. Heyman argues that addiction should be viewed as a self-
correcting disorder where “choice problems” are at the root of addiction. Unlike a chronic 
                                                 
17 American Psychological Association, http://www.apa.org/topics/addiction/index.aspx (accessed 
December 26, 2016.) 
11 
health condition over which an individual may not have control, an addict has voluntary 
control over his choices. Heyman develops an argument that people differ in how they 
frame a sequence of choices: those who act from a “local choice standpoint” where they 
choose between items one at a time and are only concerned with short-term 
consequences, are more likely to become addicted than those who use a “global choice 
perspective” in which they organize choices into sequences and then choose between 
different sequences. Choices are, therefore, embedded within strategies that take into 
consideration “global view” or “local view;” choice is not a matter of free will as it is 
often dependent on external circumstances and heredity.18 One of the critiques of the 
framing approach is lack of explanation of how these choices can actually be framed.19  
As mentioned earlier, most “soft” addictions or compulsive behaviors are not 
classified as psychiatric ailments by the American Psychiatric Association. This paper 
does not seek to support or negate the view that negative compulsive behaviors should or 
should not be classified as a mental disorder, which is defined as a dysfunctional thought 
process or behavior that causes harm. In my interpretation, there is currently no clear 
definition of “addiction” as psychologists still struggle with a clear definition which is 
constantly in the state of flux as new research in the area of neuroscience, cognitive and 
behavioral psychology emerges and the DSM manual undergoes periodic updates. For the 
purposes of my argument, I intend to treat any behavior that we would perceive as 
voluntary, i.e. where an individual “should” possess a choice of whether or not to act 
upon a particular urge to engage in it, while intellectually wanting to do the opposite, as 
                                                 
18 Heyman, G. M. (2009). Addiction: A disorder of choice. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
 
19 As noted in Kurti, A. N., & Dallery, J. (2012). Review of Heyman's Addiction: A disorder of choice. 
Malden: University of Kansas. doi:10.1901/jaba.2012.45-229 
12 
an “addiction” or a “compulsion.” Many sources (substances or behaviors) may form a 
low or a high level of neurobiological and psychological dependency; they range from 
those compulsions that are socially deemed positive, such as exercise; those behaviors 
that society has defined as “illegal” or “immoral,” such as substance abuse; and those that 
constitute a grey area such as food and sex addictions (there is an ongoing professional 
disagreement on whether or not these should be treated as “addictions”). The more 
encompassing terminology is particularly relevant to paper’s future discussion on conflict 
of successive motivational states and dissociation of “personalities” within an addicted 
individual, as one “self” wishes to constrain or entirely quit in the long-run and another 
“self” succumbs to temptation of immediate gratification; one self wants to act in 
accordance with good judgement, while the other attempts to undermine this goal. There 
is a significant internal ambivalence, which is the first aspect that appears to violate 
rationality of homo economicus.  
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Chapter Two: Exploring the Basics of the Neoclassical Economic Theory 
The neoclassical model of rational choice has had limited success in explaining 
economic and certain non-economic behavior in simplified terms, but it has not been 
successful in explaining psychologically and ethically motivated behavior. The following 
chapter will focus on briefly presenting the core foundations of the conventional 
economic theory and the concept of “rational man” or Homo economicus: 
Summary of the Neoclassic Economic Theory 
Standard economic theory of consumer choice exemplifies economic agent’s 
motivation to obtain pleasure and avoid pain, in thereof maximizing her well-being. 
Economic agent has come to be represented as homo economicus: he is often described as 
an “enlightened egoist.” The origin of the idea of “economic man” is generally traced 
back to John Stuart Mill, while the Latin use of homo economicus can be found in works 
of other 19th century economists such as Jevons, Walras and Pareto (the general concept 
of a self-interested individual can be found in works of Aristotle as well as classical 
economists). Mill’s “economic man” possesses four primary goals: accumulation, leisure, 
luxury and procreation, which should be attained with the least amount of labor and 
“physical self-denial.” In Mill’s view, these primary drives were enough in order to avoid 
complicating the theory and supporting empirical evidence and rising “indeterminacy”. 
Mill recognized that certain motives, such as procreation, may cause the economic man 
to act irrationally. Mill used “economic man” and his undeveloped psychology to 
 14 
demonstrate that institutions matter; his concept of rationality is different from the 
neoclassic sense of rationality, i.e. rationality of choice, which views homo economicus 
as an agent with complete knowledge and choice selection of out self-interest and desire 
for highest possible level of utility or well-being.20 
Homo economicus serves as a model human being that exhibits rational 
maximization of self-interest and represents the society as a whole. The fundamental 
economic motive of self-interest was originally described by Adam Smith. Within the 
neoclassical model the agent maximizes a utility function in which utility is a function of 
the quantity of goods and services consumed by the individual: the utility function places 
the individual at the center dismissing any “humane” attributes. Jeremy Bentham, in his 
case of utilitarianism, has proposed a conception of “felicific calculus.” He argued that 
utility is a net sum of positive over negative emotions and it contributes to happiness of 
every rational human being. Utilitarianism also considers consequentialism where an 
action must be judged for its consequences on the happiness of the largest number.21 
However, this view of “utility” as an indication of person’s overall well-being ran into 
issues of quantifying “happiness” and finding a the measure for the amount of utility. 
During the dawn of neoclassical school revolution, William Jevons, Carl Menger 
and Leon Walras sought to advance and reformulate some of the classical assumptions. 
While classical theory focused on how a commodity derives its value from the labor and 
production costs, the neoclassical theory focused on marginal utility to further explain 
                                                 
20 Persky, J. (1995). “Retrospectives the ethology of homo economicus.” The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives (1986-1998), 9(2), p. 223-24. 
 
21 Stanford Dictionary of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianism-history/ (accessed 
December 20th, 2015).  
 15 
and understand consumer preferences and behavior. Richard Langlois points out that 
neoclassical framework explores “means and ends” as “agent’s behavior reflects the 
solution to a logical problem of allocation;” this foundation then allowed neoclassical 
economists to frame the “logical problem with the mathematical problem of 
optimization” while incorporating elements of “utilitarian psychology.”22 
Through “calculus of pleasure and pain” Jevons explained that rational people 
base decisions on extra marginal utility. Humans seek to procure the "greatest amount of 
what is desirable at the expense of the least that is undesirable" and this needs to be tied 
to a commodity which is defined as an “object, substance, action of service which can 
afford pleasure or ward off pain.”23 It is implied that individuals possess all the necessary 
information to analyze various commodity alternatives, agents can then rank 
commodities in the order of preference; utility value is inferred from observed 
preferences. People choose the best bundle under a given budget constraint; observing 
several consumption choices can then allow for an estimation of an individual utility 
function which can be used to predict future choices. Consumers also operate under the 
law of diminishing marginal utility, with a limited desire for specific commodities that 
falls after an optimal level of such commodity is received; commodities may not be 
perfect substitutes for each other in the satisfaction of specific yearnings.24  Jevons also 
stated that “anything which an individual is found to desire and to labour for must be 
                                                 
22 Langlois, R. “Rationality in economics.” http://www.sp.uconn.edu/~langlois/r700.htm  (accessed January 
31, 2016).  
 
23 Jevons, W. S. (1888). The Theory of Political Economy (Third ed.). London: Macmillan and Co. 
http://www.econlib.org/library/YPDBooks/Jevons/jvnPECover.html (accessed November 20, 2015).  
 
24 Varian, H. (2010). Intermediate Microeconomics. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. 
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assumed to possess for him utility.”25 This statement implies that even what can be 
viewed as irrational detrimental behavior can be viewed as utility maximizing. Jevons has 
also suggested that time preference and anticipation permeate economic behavior: 
The cares of the moment are but ripples on the tide of achievement and hope. We 
may safely call that man happy who, however lowly his position and limited his 
possessions, can always hope for more than he has, and can feel that every 
moment of exertion tends to realize his as-pirations. He, on the contrary, who 
seizes the enjoyment of the passing moment without regard to coming times, must 
discover sooner or later that his stock of pleasure is on the wane, and that even 
hope begins to fail.26  
 
Homo economicus operates within the framework of rational choice theory 
making his or her choice based on individual preferences under constraints of scarcity 
and seeking efficiency, as he weighs opportunity costs of various alternatives in order to 
find the best long-term returns from least immediate investment. As mentioned 
previously, the individual is assumed to possess perfect information in order to make an 
efficient choice; even when the outcome is uncertain, an individual can make a 
judgement call based on expected utility.  Individuals exhibit rational behavior which 
equates to acting consistently with one’s utility function and constant rate of time 
preference, which is not context dependent. Standard theory presents a discount rate, or a 
rate at which individuals discount the future relative to the present based on the 
opportunity cost of delay, which is exponential in nature, modeling consistence of 
preference over time with preference for smaller immediate rewards and larger ones in 
the future. Homo economicus consistently chooses options to maximize positive or 
pleasurable with allowance for reduced value of delayed rewards. This implies that once 
                                                 
25 Jevons, p. 9. 
 
26 Ibid. 
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an individual makes a choice to pursue a positive behavior, he or she will not deviate 
from such intention. Exponential curves are a form of normative economic modeling as 
they attempt to demonstrate subjective judgements of neoclassical assumptions and do 
not describe people’s actual valuations; the rational agent in the model should be 
discounting at a constant rate over time and should not want to deviate from original 
preferences in order to ensure the outcome that is ought to be. The model does not allow 
for “irrational” behavior.  
In general terms, neoclassical economics is founded on the notion that people 
have a limitless capacity for rationality, willpower and selfishness. We set goals and 
pursue them with intellect by using all available information and resources. 
Microeconomic theory focuses on individuals involved in bargaining for various goods 
and good bundles within an enclosed market system, undergoing real and hypothetical 
games, to make a price or value determination. Rational choice theory further takes this 
concept and applies it to quantifying people’s behavior toward unpriced objects within 
social institutions such as crime and marriage with the scriptures of economic laws. This 
approach represents economics behavior as a solution to a constrained optimization 
problem “faced by a fully informed individual in a virtually institution-free 
environment.”27 Homo economicus presents an idealistic view of human nature, governed 
by rational behavior with illusion of control, void of powerful emotions within an 
existence that is complex, dynamic and chaotic. It can then be concluded that our 
decision-making is not governed by the context of thoughts, desires, feelings, values and 
                                                 
27 Bowles, S. (2004). Microeconomics: Behavior, institutions, and evolution. New York; Princeton, N.J;: 
Russell Sage Foundation, p. 9. 
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other intrinsic states. Any phenomena that do not fall in line with canonical Walrasian 
assumptions are referred to as “anomalies,” which are defined as an empirical result if it 
is “difficult to rationalize” or if implausible assumptions are necessary to explain within 
the paradigm of the standard economic view that most behavior can be explained by 
rational agents with stable well defined preferences interact in markets that eventually 
clear.28  
Overview of the Rational Choice and Rational Addiction Theories 
A prominent economist and philosopher Amartya Sen concisely summarizes 
some of the tenets of the rationality conception as presented by the standard economic 
theory: 
It seems easy to accept that rationality involves many features that cannot be 
summarized in terms of some straightforward formula, such as binary 
consistency.  But this recognition does not immediately lead to alternative 
characterizations that might be regarded as satisfactory, even though the 
inadequacies of the traditional assumptions of rational behaviour standardly used 
in economic theory have become hard to deny.  It will not be an easy task to find 
replacements for the standard assumptions of rational behaviour ... that can be 
found in the traditional economic literature, both because the identified 
deficiencies have been seen as calling for rather divergent remedies, and also 
because there is little hope of finding an alternative assumption structure that will 
be as simple and usable as the traditional assumptions of self-interest 
maximization, or of consistency of choice.29  
 
Drawing on premises of the neoclassical economic model, rational choice (action) theory 
is a framework that is commonly used in modeling social and economic behavior in 
which a rational agent bases his choices on a consideration for his personal utility 
function. It describes human behavior as determined by rational individual decisions as 
                                                 
28 Richard Thaler in Ibid. 
29 Sen, Amartya.  (1990). “Rational Behavior,” in Eatwell, John, Milgate, Murray, and Newman Peter, 
Utility and Probability (New York:  W. W. Norton & Company), p. 206. 
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people seek to maximize expected utility. There are several underlying assumptions: 1) 
an individual faces a known set of alternative choices; 2) preferences are complete and 
transitive 3) consumer possesses information about all choices and outcomes of any given 
choice 4) individual has the time and ability to weigh choices against one another.30 
Standard economic models that attempt to explain human behavior as related to akratic 
behavior are largely based on rational choice theory. There are several Rational 
Addiction models all of which assume rational consumers with stable time preferences 
and emphasize individual differences in discounting.31 Most take the following approach: 
since addictions produce tolerance, current consumption increases marginal utility for 
future consumption and manifests itself as habit formation. Consumption decisions that 
may be viewed as excessive or harmful are defined as “rational” since addicted 
individuals exhibit optimizing economic behavior within the context focused on time 
allocation and consumption decisions.  
 In their influential 1988 article “A Theory of Rational Addiction,” Gary Becker 
and Kevin Murphy presented a framework, based in an earlier rational choice theory of 
addiction model by Stigler and Becker, aligned with neoclassical postulates 
demonstrating that addictions are rational overtime and are consistent with optimization 
of stable preferences.32 The model explains present and future behaviors as a part of a 
                                                 
30 Green, S. (2002) “Rational Choice Theory: An Overview.” https://business.baylore.edu/steve_green-
green1.doc  (accessed December 16, 2015). 
  
31 Bretteville-Jensen, A. L. (1999). Addiction and discounting. Journal of Health Economics, 18(4), 393-
407. doi:10.1016/S0167-6296(98)00057-5 
32 For detailed information, please refer to Becker, G. S., & Murphy, K. M. (1988). “A Theory of Rational 
Addiction.” The Journal of Political Economy, 96(4), 675; or interpretation Ferguson, B. S. (2000). 
“Interpreting the rational addiction model.” Health Economics, 9(7), 587-598. doi:10.1002/1099-
1050(200010) 
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consistent, maximizing plan, represented by utility function U(0), given equation (1) 
under budget constraint (2); non-addictive goods are defined as y and addicting goods as 
c (as described in Vale)33: 
U(0) =  
(1)  
(2)  
 Individuals recognize the addictive nature of their choices, but pursue them 
regardless as the gains from a potentially harmful activity exceed any costs of future 
addiction; consumption of addictive goods today will depend not only on past 
consumption but future consumption as well. Within the model, the higher past 
consumption of c, measured by accumulative variable S, the higher is the marginal utility 
of the consumption of c today and lower is the current total utility. The individual is 
aware of both short-term and long-term consequences of her consumption, represented by 
an exponential and stable discount factor σ, which implies consistency in the individual’s 
decisions over time. The model can, therefore, demonstrate that it may be most rational 
for the agent to choose consumption of addicting good c despite that at the moment of 
choice large S value reduces welfare.34  
The key feature of these models is that a consumer’s utility in any given period 
depends not just on consumption in that period, but also on “consumption capital,” which 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
33 Vale, P. H. (2010). “Addiction and rational choice theory.” International Journal of Consumer Studies, 
34(1), 38-45. doi:10.1111/j.1470-6431.2009.00826.x 
34 Ibid. 
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is consumer’s ability to enjoy a particular good. The level of enjoyment is dependent on 
past consumption. If past consumption enhances current enjoyment, the addiction is 
viewed as beneficial.35 Becker and Murphy state that their model can also be used to 
explain cycles of restriction and bingeing if amendments are made to the analysis based 
on only one kind of consumption capital. For example, an individual who is overeating 
and dieting, can have two types of consumption capital such as “health capital” and 
“eating capital” where food consumption can be both harmful and beneficial. There are 
elements of utility maximization as an individual goes through cycles of dieting and 
overconsumptions: as eating increases, health capital falls and eating capital rises. 
 It is documented that many individuals that experience addictive tendencies with 
substances (legal or illegal) as well as compulsive behaviors began with “experimenting” 
prior to increasing consumption up to the level of being dependent. Rational addiction 
theories use stable preferences to explain this unstable consumption by viewing present 
consumption as a partial investment behavior, i.e. increase of stock of the addictive 
substance. According to model’s framework, engaging in any addictive/compulsive 
behavior increases future stocks. It also assumes that individuals have accurate 
quantitative estimates of effects on these stocks, both positive and negative, as well as 
external factors such as prices, norms and public regulations. Individuals have the ability 
to “design a detailed consumption plan for their future life exhausting all gains from all 
trade-offs across time and goods conditional on opportunities and exogenous factors.”36 
                                                 
35 Green, p. 29. 
 
36 Rogeberg, O. (2004). “Taking absurd theories seriously: Economics and the case of rational addiction 
theories.” Philosophy of Science, 71(3), 263-285. doi:10.1086/421535, p. 271. 
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Becker and Murphy also state that “addictions, even strong ones, are usually rational in 
the sense of involving forward-looking maximization with stable preferences” and that 
addicts “would be even more unhappy if they were prevented from consuming the 
addictive goods.”37 The Rational Addiction model represents emotions as additional 
psychic costs, in addition to material costs; the choice is then made on a tradeoff between 
emotional negative rewards and potential material rewards: emotions therefore only 
change the parameter and pay-off of choice but not the rational foundation of decision 
making. Some implications of this model are that demand for addictive goods is generally 
sensitive to permanent changes in price and that strong addictions must end in a “cold 
turkey” manner: “rational persons end stronger addictions more rapidly than weaker 
ones.”38  
The original model has provided basis for next-generation models such as those 
presented by Orphanides and Zervos in 1995 and Gruber and Koszegi in 2001. 
Orphanides and Zervos attempted to mitigate the unlikely real-world trait of perfect 
foresight and planning of an agent in the Becker-Murphy model as well as to address the 
phenomenon of regret and relapses.39 They recognize the role of experimentation and 
subjective beliefs and attempt to explain the paradox of pursuing addicting behaviors and 
regret. The authors stipulate that addiction results from time consistent expected utility 
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maximization with an explicit tradeoff between rewards of current consumption and the 
expected costs of lower future utility including the detrimental effect of higher 
discounting; the model explicitly accounts for uncertainty regarding timing and 
magnitude of negative effects and illustrate “importance of the resulting heterogeneity in 
outcomes for understanding addiction incidence and ex post regret.”40 The model 
assumes that people are either predisposed or invulnerable to addictions. It introduces 
uncertainty through three postulates: 
Consumption of the addictive good is not equally harmful to all individuals, that 
each individual possesses a subjective belief structure concerning his potential to 
become addicted and that this belief structure is optimally updated with 
information gained through consumption, via Bayesian learning process.41 
 
According to the model, in order to find out one’s vulnerability to addiction, an 
individual must first consume an addictive substance and figure out if she is a vulnerable 
or invulnerable subtype. The authors also state that people are drawn into addiction and 
that it is an “unintended occasional outcome of experimenting with an addictive good:” it 
is not a preplanned action but an “incorrect assessment of the possibility of becoming an 
addict.”42 A critique of the actual model states that it shows the opposite, i.e. that 
addictions are a deliberate plan as the individual must test her threshold to addiction 
before making a rational choice to either continue consumption or to quit. 
 Proponents of Rational Addiction models point out that their construct allows for 
a straightforward approach to examining such behavior as the only significant factor as 
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individual consumption over time; there is no need to differentiate between physical and 
psychological aspects of addiction. Unlike other views on addictions Rational Addiction 
models simply describe behavior without condemning it; this rules out self-control 
problems. For example, in a conditional termed as “adjacent complementarity,” a 
consumer will most likely choose/use a product that was used the last time that she was 
confronted with a choice among it and other alternatives.43 For example, someone 
choosing between a “junk food” option and a healthier option that was not tried before, 
would most likely choose the former as the choice is simpler and requires less mental 
accounting. An addict rationally chooses to trade off short-term benefits of self-defeating 
behavior with long-term costs as compromising ones’ future health.44 The approach is 
simple: an addict weighed both past consumption and forward-looking costs; if the 
benefits outweigh the costs then the behavior becomes rational in her mind. 
 The Rational Addiction Theory remains one of the commonly used methods of 
economic analysis in the markets of legal and illegal addictive substances. It represents a 
clear case of “economic imperialism.” It is important to point out that no empirical tests 
were performed on the original model; however, it has undergone testing in subsequent 
years, with mixed results. Most urge “caution” in conclusions drawn from its applications 
as “at the aggregate level, there is no good reason to expect to see the dynamics predicted 
by models of individual optimizing behavior reappear.”45 It has come under immense 
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scrutiny in the past several years, particularly from its inability to explain as to why 
rational individuals would start using a product with a risk of dependence and detrimental 
effects in the first place as well as a commonly observed feelings of regret among addicts. 
Older and newer models show individuals who choose their addiction even after careful 
consideration of alternatives and costs, without questioning their actions or being 
involuntarily hooked. The choice to become addicted is, for example, explained by 
describing those who became addicted due to a negative shock and used their addiction as 
a positive consumption capital to offset emotional stress, will still obtain the highest 
welfare by being addicted, even after the negative effects subside, implying that it is more 
“rational” to numb out the emotion than to fully experience them.  
 Economist Ole Rogeberg has referred to the Rational Addiction Theory as “silly” 
and “absurd” due to the flaws in its basic assumptions, strong reliance on mathematical 
modeling and convenient explanation: the theory uses “mathematical modeling that is 
empirically unfalsifiable, based on widely inaccurate assumptions and poorly interpreted 
in a selective way.”46 Rogeberg contends that economists often claim that mathematical 
choice models do not need to comprehensively reflect the process by which individuals 
identify the solution to a decision problem as long as such models can specify at which 
outcome the decision process will ultimately arrive.47 The models are critiqued for their 
lack of supporting evidence and a narrow approach to the decision making process. Some 
argue that harmful behavior can be explained within a Rational Choice framework only if 
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narratives from other fields are used to support such claims. Rationality supposition is 
then not a restriction if the modeling is flexible in its postulation about human motivation 
and desire. For example, recent advances in evolutionary biology and understanding of 
genetics and neurochemistry present a view in which individuals may choose to overeat, 
leading to obesity, in order to mitigate starvation risk. Consumers can be viewed as 
rational as they maximize their present and future well-being in a time consistent manner 
(in this case, constant feeling of satiety). This is true as long as long as psychology of 
self-control and its non-stationary intertemporal utility function does not interfere.48 As a 
result, the mainstream theory is not wrong because it is empirically inaccurate, but 
because the rationality axiom based on utility maximization also depends on auxiliary 
assumptions to generate specific results. 
 This presents a major flaw in the Rational Addiction model, rational choice theory 
and neoclassical economic theory overall. In his article “On the Limits of Rational 
Choice Theory,” Geoffrey Hodgson states:  
 A theory does not explain anything unless it points to an underlying causal 
mechanism. In the case of individual behaviour, explanations must thus relate to 
the known mechanisms of the human psyche and human interaction and draw 
upon psychology, anthropology, sociology and other disciplines. This is precisely 
what the neoclassical advocates of utility theory refuse to do. They take the utility 
functions as given and give the job of grounding them theoretically to somebody 
else. By this refusal they indicate that utility theory itself cannot provide a real 
explanation.49  
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As mentioned in the previous section, standard economic theory upholds the definition of 
rationality as a consistent behavior.  Models based on the homo economicus agent 
principle assume that this hypothetical individual knows what is best for his long-term 
physical and mental health and can be relied upon to always make the right decision for 
himself.  Rational choice theory proponents argue that there is evidence that utility 
maximization can be applied to humans in all forms of society and other species as well. 
This puts into question of how the theory can then be applied to a rational economic man 
existing in an environment of developed institutions and cultures. The method of 
application presents a problem when it fails to recognize the importance of human 
psychology, human interaction and human society. “Its very weakness, when applied to 
the human domain, stems from its excessive scope.”50 Rational choice model assumes 
that desires result in rational choices; however, desires may prevent the necessary 
information gathering, which may not result in the best course of action when one 
encounters issues of self-control. It is a normative model in the sense that it can be used 
to assess decisions as the model, essentially, supposes that human beings should seek 
rationality and shun irrationality. The model posits that irrationality is a product of an 
erroneous valuation process and that there is no legitimate reason for an addiction (along 
with its negative consequences or costs) to occur. The choice is then not an “irrational” 
choice, but an “erroneous” choice. The model fails to explain why consumers may 
experience disappointment with their consumption choices and wish they had more 
control over these choices; no inner conflict exists to prevent an individual from 
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obtaining a desired consumption bundle. According to Andrew Yuengert, "a policymaker 
using current rational addiction framework can never consistently argue (without 
recourse to externalities) for involuntary restraints on addicted persons.”51 The RA model 
explains why someone would completely stop an addiction, but cannot explain why 
someone might relapse or why someone would seek out external support in ending an 
addiction.52 The exogeneity of preferences in the homo economicus model is a major 
distinction from homo sociologicus, in which tastes are taken as partially or even totally 
determined by the societal environment. Further, critics, learning from the broadly-
defined psychoanalytic tradition, criticize the homo economicus model as ignoring the 
inner conflicts that real-world individuals suffer, as between short-term and long-term 
goals (e.g., eating chocolate cake and losing weight) or between individual goals and 
societal values. Such conflicts may lead to "irrational" behavior involving inconsistency, 
psychological paralysis, neurosis, and/or psychic pain. 
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Chapter Three: The Rise of Behavioral Economics 
Assumptions of the rational choice theory and the neoclassical economic theory in 
general have come under criticism stemming from significant development in 
psychological research. Even if some tenets of standard assumptions are removed in 
updated models of consumer choice theory, common principles of neoclassical paradigm 
are still evident, specifically equilibrium, greed and rationality. Economists view 
behaviors that violate rationality as idiosyncratic and therefore, abstain from formally 
analyzing such behavior within established scientific and mathematical parameters. 
However, considering that experimental subjects consistently exhibit irrational behaviors 
such as intransitivity and inconsistency in temporal discounting demonstrates that these 
behaviors are common and should allow for analysis.53 The standard model of consumer 
behavior may be “simple and elegant”, but is insufficient to describe consumer choice 
behavior. Three prominent factors the existence of which have been identified as rational 
choice theory critiques: bounded willpower, bounded rationality and bounded self-
interest.  
The revealed preferences approach is limited as it does not take into consideration 
motives and reasons. Neoclassical method still hinges on the its core view that economics 
cannot take into account subjective states since scientific approach must focus on 
observable behavior. The utilitarian approach, which takes into account subjective states 
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such as pleasure, pain, satisfaction, is now more relevant as such experiences can now be 
measured; however, this approach is still flawed as reasons for human activity can 
include addictions, weakness of will, myopia and other dysfunctional behaviors.54 Both 
approaches are limited in their incorporation of preferences, beliefs and institutions. The 
standard model depicts passage of time as a discount rate without addressing the fact that 
people have an ability to learn and acquire new preferences over time. While this paper 
will not address social and evolutionary aspects that influence people’s behavior, it is 
important to acknowledge the need to account for people’s heterogeneity, versatility and 
plasticity.55 Preferences cannot be viewed as normative and must incorporate common 
reasons that induce unfavorable behavior such as addiction. As noted previously, 
conventional theory views preexisting preferences as an explanation for a given behavior. 
However, psychologists stipulate that people create preferences “through act of choosing 
and consuming.”56 Herbert Simon further differentiates between the way the two 
disciplines view rationality by stating that economics is concerned with “substantive 
theory of rationality” in which a decision is reached objectively based on a given utility 
function; while psychology is concerned with procedural rationality, seeking to determine 
the processes that underlie choices and explain how motivations, emotions and sensory 
stimuli influence behavior.57  
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In recent years, “Behavioral Decision Research” contributed to creation of a field 
of behavioral economics, which takes into consideration effects of psychological, social, 
cognitive, and emotional factors on the economic decisions of individuals and 
institutions. One of proposed definitions of behavioral economics is describes it as “the 
study of the allocation of behavior within a system of constraint and examines conditions 
that influence the consumption of commodities.”58 Among other variables, Behavioral 
Economics attempts to incorporate two aspects taken as givens in the standard model: 
uncertainty and time. Behavioral economists argue that while individuals intentionally 
pursue objectives, they do so through “discovered” responses of past experiences rather 
than by engaging in the cognitively demanding forward-looking optimizing process.59  
Incorporation of psychology into economics is not a new phenomenon in; after 
all, prominent classical economists were specifically interested in human nature.60 The 
rejection of psychology as a social science began with neoclassical revolution as 
neoclassical economists wanted to tie the economic discipline to the natural sciences and 
to root its foundation in scientific inquiry and mathematical basis. Neoclassical 
economists also wanted to distance themselves from the hedonistic assumptions of 
Benthamite utility, although psychologists of the time were also rejecting hedonism as 
the basis of behavior. William James, for example, wrote that “psychological hedonists 
obey a curiously narrow teleological superstition, for they assume without foundation that 
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behavior always aims at the goal of maximum pleasure and minimum pain; but behavior 
is often impulsive, not goal-oriented.”61  
In his essay entitled “A Psychological Perspective on Economics,” Daniel 
Kahneman points out that even after 30 years of integrative research and attempts to 
integrate behavioral sciences into economics, upon a review of introductory economics 
textbooks “the same assumptions are still in place as the cornerstones of economic 
analysis.”62 Significant strides have been made in correction of assumption of selfishness 
through invention of the ultimatum game, brain-imaging studies of people of people 
playing games show signs of trust and reciprocation, confirming significance of social 
situation, showing a progress in modeling agents as Sen’s “rational fools.” 
Kahneman further explores the concept of rationality: he states that this 
assumption has generally been viewed as an “approximation, which is made in the belief 
(or hope) that departures from rationality are rare when the stakes are significant, or that 
they will disappear under the discipline of the market.”63 However, not all economists 
have agreed that small deviations from rationality are irrelevant and that irrational agents 
are driven out of the marketplace.64 There are underlying issues even when purely 
market-based monetary transactions are considered; for example, people value sunk costs 
more than the equivalent opportunity costs and in experimental gambling situations often 
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do not maximize expected value; however people frequently engage in gambling and 
some even become compulsive.65 Economists must now take into consideration 
unpurchaseable goods and factors that influence human choice, which can often lead to 
an observed irrational behavior.  
  Neoclassic theory emphasis on utility maximization fails to present empirically 
testable auxiliary assumptions that describe external and internal factors that contribute to 
the decision-making process. Critics of standard economic theory of choice stress 
uncertainty and bounded rationality roles in the making of economic decisions, as 
opposed to the model of a rational agent who is informed of all circumstances impinging 
on his decisions. Integration of psychological research into the framework of substantive 
rationality allows to explore complexity of learning and decision processes. Behavioral 
economists argue that perfect knowledge never exists, which means that all economic 
activity implies risk. Kahneman and Tversky further showed experimental evidence that 
clearly pointed that preferences are affected by framing of decision problems. Several 
models with various contexts have been developed that further put the notion of “rational 
agent” into question, including models of quasi-hyperbolic and hyperbolic discounting 
and models which acknowledge self-control. 
The concepts of satisficing and bounded rationality, first introduced by Herbert 
Simon in 1955, sought to provide a realistic normative standard and is presented in both 
the “old” and the “new” school of behavioral economics. Bounded rationality contradicts 
the notion that individuals continuously make perfectly rational decisions due to 
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cognitive limitations and the time available to make decisions. Individuals use heuristics, 
or mental shortcuts to make decisions due to inability to process the expected utility of 
every alternative action. It is also important to mention Kahneman and Tversky’s 
prospect theory which accounts for context in which an individual makes a choice, in 
attempt to reformulate the standard view that preferences are exogenous and purely 
subjective.66  
 A recognition of suboptimal choices in decision making have contributed to 
development of behavioral economics which intends to marry standard economic theory 
with empirical findings from psychology and neurosciences. However, Kahneman points 
out that, even though current economic analysis now integrates more plausible 
psychological factors, the analytical methodology is constrained by the number of 
parameters that can be added to a particular economic model; there are “no immediate 
prospects of economics and psychology sharing a common theory of human behavior.”67 
The majority of behavioral economic research focuses on observing and predicting how 
individuals make choices under a specific context, within a given option set, at a specific 
moment; it aims to show a “deviation from a benchmark of rational choice, where the 
size of the deviation measures the loss of utility.” Behavioral economics has been able to 
demonstrate a “systematic and widespread” deviation from rational choice, while 
maintaining the link to the rational model.68 Many of the psychological assumptions 
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incorporated into economics remain compatible with the standard economic theory since, 
for the most part, individual economic agents remain the focal point; and while they are 
viewed under the prism of bounded rationality, agent’s main objective remains choice 
optimization. It is argued that the prospect theory merely “weakens” the atomistic 
individual view since the theory still treats context as partially influencing choice of 
individuals with stable, well-defined value functions.69 Both microeconomic and 
behavioral psychology and economic models fail to explain these phenomenon which 
appear to be more psychological and philosophical in nature. 
Behavioral economics literature that deals with health-related behavior and 
decisions, including materials related to addiction and substance abuse, typically revolves 
around two concepts found in the standard microeconomic theory: elasticity of demand 
and discounting. This paper specifically focuses on discounting and two different 
alternatives of how delayed reinforces are valued in comparison to immediate reinforces. 
As a reminder, Rational Addiction model and its iterations have provided an exponential 
discounting model, i.e. each unit of time that constitutes the delay in delivery, the value 
of a reward decreases by a fixed proportion. However, an alternative view regarding 
choices and long-term health implications has emerged. 
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Chapter Four: Picoeconomics and Its Application to the Addiction Phenomenon 
Overview of “picoeconomics” 
Picoeconomics or “micro-microeconomics” blends within itself the standard 
economic model as well as behavioral economics. There is an internal psychological 
economy that leads individuals to making choices. It attempts to describe a marketplace 
of motivations trying to obtain psychological hedonism. It integrates self-control 
problems into economics and discusses habit formation to demonstrate that people often 
choose to act in a less than optimal fashion by acting within a framework that is 
comfortable or habitual. The theory also posits itself as a foundation to investigate 
“complex struggles with self-control that have traditionally eluded reductionist 
psychology.”70  
The official terminology for this theory was originally presented by George 
Ainslie, an American psychiatrist, psychologist and behavioral economist, through 
various earlier articles and his book Picoeconomics, although certain elements of this 
conceptual framework can be found in a variety of behavioral and philosophical 
literature. Ainslie was influenced by features of Freudian conception of id, ego and 
superego as different parts of self or personality come into conflict with one another. 
Short-term interests can be viewed as Id, long-term interest are similar to Ego and 
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willpower to protect long-term interests from being defeated by short-term impulses is 
equivalent to Superego. This formulation of theory of decision making is intended to 
challenge rational choice theory and the supposition that the discount curve of value of 
expected events is exponential because it is the only way that conventional utility theory 
can protect its foundation from shifting preferences and ensuring consistency of behavior 
of the homo economicus. The concept of value defined by one’s ability to satisfy visceral 
desires for concrete goods that trade in a cash market is easier to define within standard 
economic theory parameters than “subtle goods that defy precise characterization and 
ignore human motivation processes that determine subjective value that an individual 
places.” One may consider that in a society where material needs are supposedly satiated, 
emotional experience is the important source of reward; this aspect also causes people to 
try to gain such emotional rewards as soon as possible due to hyperbolically based 
impatience for short-term rewards. Ainslie presents various arguments and empirical 
evidence that discounting the future is part of human psychology and cannot be 
simplified by only looking at specific factors such as uncertainty about the future, 
pleasure-seeking and yearning for immediate gratification as well as conditioned 
responses to immediate stimuli (a common trait of addiction). In an addicted individual, 
the goal of a desired substance is the ultimate fixed value to be obtained at potentially a 
great cost, while value of everything else fleetingly becomes nothing.71 
Psychological research has also experienced setback in its approach to motivation; 
while there is significant empirical evidence for concrete rewards through reinforcement 
which is similar in its underpinnings to the marketplace model in economics, many 
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foundational psychological models cannot account for why people often fail to maximize 
“any shopping list of goods, but rather behave in ways that look internally 
contradictory.”72 There are several considerations which account for why both 
economists and psychologists have a difficulty accurately defining desirable commodities 
or rewards: 1) rewards can function simultaneously or in close succession as both 
rewards and punishments (paying for cigarettes and for a smoking cure); rewards are 
changeable wherein an object which is highly desirable to a person (or a society) in one 
time period may be worthless in the next. Goods can lose their motivating power, for 
example, in instances of anorexia nervosa, abstinence or suicide; many rewards cannot be 
produced by direct effort, e.g. emotional responses cannot be controlled; individuals also 
willingly undergo “painful” stimuli which is counterintuitive to the pleasure-seeking 
behavior (i.e. medical procedures, etc.) Rational behavior grounded in the merits of utility 
theory is not realistic, as utility is itself is subjective while consequentialism can only be 
applied to the external world. An individual who is engaged in a self-harming behavior 
may only be able to perceive consequences to herself although in many instances, 
addictive behaviors may have a negative impact on those around.73  
An important concept that needs to be related to this discussion is the conceptual 
framework of discounting, specifically how delayed rewards are discounted by 
individuals. As previously explored, delayed discounting is a theory that models a 
reduction in the present value of reward when there is a delay in obtaining said reward. 
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All such choices are intertemporal, i.e. possess a time dimension that calculates tradeoffs 
between costs and benefits at various times. Normative economic models present a 
framework in which present value decreases by a fixed proportion per unit of time that an 
agent must wait for the reward, resulting in an exponential discounting model; under this 
assumption, a reward that is preferred to another from one “temporal vantage point is 
preferred from any temporal vantage point.”74 The common type of time preference 
function can be written as (1 - r)t, with discount rate designated as r and t representing the 
duration of the delay.  The intertemporal choice model of discounted utility, developed 
principally by Paul Samuelson, is represented as the following, where ct is consumption 
in period t, r is the market rate of interest and W (wealth) is the net present value of the 
consumer’s future income plus present wealth, evaluated at time 0; δ represents 
individual’s discount factor, which is assumed to be 0<δ<1, showing that future expected 
utility is considered in current decision, but is less significant than the current utility:75  
(1)  
 
 
subject to 
 
 
(2)  
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This model is viewed as one-dimensional, as it hinges on one parameter of δ; 
smaller values of δ indicate greater impatience, while larger values show patience. Paul 
Samuelson, who originally proposed the discounted-utility model, himself stated that 
while it is “simple and similar to present value calculations applicable to financial flows,” 
it is psychologically implausible.76 It depicts an individual who is not completely myopic, 
and, while being somewhat impatient, the behavior is consistent and forward-looking, 
meaning that preferences will not reverse over time. Empirical evidence, particularly that 
concerning drug-addicted individuals, does not support this view, specifically under the 
circumstances when loss of control and impulsivity aspects of addiction are noted.  
Parametric studies of choice demonstrate a Herrnstein’s Matching Law which 
shows a preference for goods at different delays will change as a function of time. From 
empirical evidence it is observed that the discount rate curve of both human and non-
human subjects is hyperbolic with value inversely proportional to delay as opposed to 
exponential; delay-discounting rate is inversely related to the amount of the reward and 
the length of the delay to a reward.77 There is an inherent tendency of human beings to 
undervalue future events. We experience regret if we have put off pursuing the more 
valuable goals in preference of smaller immediate rewards. The key problem in addictive 
behaviors is their ability to provide immediate gratification in the present, with costs such 
as negative impact to well-being (physical, emotional, financial, etc.) occurring in the 
future. Individuals with impulse control problems as well as those with underlying mental 
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disorders (such as anxiety and depression) have more difficulties with assessing future 
consequences; they are willing to sacrifice future gains or averting future losses, tangible 
or intangible, in exchange for an immediate pleasurable experience. However, to revert 
back to the definition of addiction, there must also be a sense of regret, i.e. the “addict” 
choses the reward, but later regrets tis choice exhibiting “present bias.” People might 
want to change their negative behavioral patterns in the “now” in order to feel better 
“later,” but when “later” comes, individual “changes her mind” and a relapse happens. 
There are cognitive processes that are shaped by intrinsic factors and external triggers 
occur which are uniquely human.78 
The picoeconomic model demonstrates time inconsistent preferences resulting in 
hyperbolic discounting. An increased valuation occurs when a fixed unit of time closer to 
an expected outcome is proportionately greater the closer one is to the outcome; the surge 
in perceived value as the individual temporarily gets closer to particular reward creates a 
systematic intertemporal preference reversal. Hyperbolic discounting function shows 
gaps of time in which a more immediate but inferior reward is temporarily preferred over 
its alternative. The following formulae and graphical representations show the difference 
between exponential and hyperbolic discount functions, which demonstrate that for the 
exponential graph (a) there is no delay for change in preferences, while for the hyperbolic 
discount graph (b), the smaller reward is valued more just as it becomes available. The 
following equation developed by Mazur is widely used to calculate the discount rate, in 
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which vd is the present discount value of a delayed reward, V is the objective value of the 
delayed reward, k is empirically derived discount rate and d is delay duration:79 
 
  
In the “Précis of Breakdown of Will,” Ainslie simplifies both exponential and hyperbolic 
discounting as the following:80  
Exponential Discount Function: 	
  
 
Hyperbolic Discount Function: 
  
Figure 1. Exponential Discounting vs. Hyperbolic Discounting (graphical representations 
by George Ainslie) 
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Figure 1(a) demonstrates two exponential discount curves, smaller-sooner and 
larger-longer rewards; their height is proportional to their value at the time that the 
smaller-sooner reward is due. Figure 1(b) shows a reversal in which the smaller reward is 
temporarily preferred for a period just before it is available (as the smaller-sooner portion 
of the curve surpasses that of the later-longer reward).  Individuals exhibit a present bias 
seeking immediate rewards due to various factors that are not included in neoclassical 
considerations such impatience that causes psychological discomfort, uncertainty in 
knowing that future rewards will produce the same level of satisfaction. As mentioned 
earlier, a major element observed in self-identified addicted populations is the inability to 
remain consistent in desire to stop an addicting activity; these populations display a 
dynamic inconsistency. Those who have a high discount rate seek immediate rewards. 
The individual also underestimates future impulsivity and exhibits preference reversal.81 
There is substantial evidence across addicted populations showing a steep delay 
discounting and intake of substance to which an individual self-reports addiction, 
especially in those who exhibit nicotine, opiate and alcohol dependency. There is also 
evidence that those who are able to “quit” show discount rates similar to those who do 
not identify as “addicts.” This suggests that discounting rate may decrease after a period 
of abstinence is achieved or that individuals who are likely to achieve abstinence discount 
more steeply.82 While impulsivity and high intertemporal discount rates are common 
traits among addicted populations they are consistent with, but do not necessarily prove 
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that individual differences in discount rates are responsible for addictive behavior.83 
There are various other characteristics that may contribute to high discount rates such as 
age, cognitive capacity, cognitive deficit and socioeconomic characteristics. Research 
contends that substance abuse and unhealthy eating behaviors are higher in urban and low 
socioeconomic status residential environment, therefore, social context cannot be 
overlooked as a contributing cause.84  
Hyperbolic discounting demonstrates instability of preferences creating 
individual, “temporarily-defined” agents within what standard economics views as a 
basic single person who is a “straightforward estimator of amounts, probabilities and 
delays of environmental events with no provision for temptation or self-control.”85 
Individuals begin to act “irrationally” as they begin to excessively discount the future. 
This approach resonates with the view of addiction described by Gene Heyman in 
Chapter 1, i.e. local and global choice perspectives. The hyperbolic model is 
remonstrative of the local approach of decision making as the individual chooses a 
substance or behavior that hold the highest value in the present. Exponential discounting, 
as it is specifically used in the Rational Addiction model, demonstrated a global choice 
perspective where an agent is capable of planning and carrying out an optimal, forward-
looking consumption plan.86 However, it is an observable fact that many tend to 
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procrastinate on acting in accordance with the optimal plan, since we often tend to choose 
instance gratification over delayed rewards, such as long-term health.  There is a 
“defective telescopic faculty” that makes us value intensity of sensual and pleasurable 
experiences in the present more than in the future.87 Humans also experience a decay of 
past experiences which makes us forget negative emotions that may have contributed to 
the prior decision to forego a present commodity or action. For example, a hangover that 
contributed to the vow to never consumer alcohol again may now be vaguely 
remembered and does not possess a potent enough negative reinforcement to prevent 
current consumption.  
The basic preference for immediate gratification is also colored by the problem of 
whether or not a person is aware of her self-control problem. O’Donoghue and Rabin 
separate individuals into “naifs” where a person is simple and intuitive rejecting a 
behavior for immediate gratification by overindulging and procrastination; 
“sophisticates,” however, are more complicated and are “influenced by the preference for 
immediate gratification,” but they also make attempts at “self-control;” in extreme cases, 
such attempts can cause a swing to the opposite side for immediate gratification. The 
study also shows that situations where a preference for immediate gratification is likely to 
involve incremental daily or moment-to-moment decisions is where self-control problems 
are able to influence behavior; for long-run decisions, such as how to divide one’s 
retirement savings among investment accounts, a preference for immediate gratification 
is unlikely to play a significant role unless an individual puts off making such a decision 
for a number of years. The study concludes that making a long sequence of daily 
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decisions, none of which seems important in isolation, even a small self-control problem 
can lead a person to behave differently from how she would have wanted to behave in a 
long-run perspective. This means that most of us are quite different from the “time-
consistent super-human” of a traditional economic model.88 Supporting study by Kang 
and Ikeda reiterates the claims that health behaviors have correlations with time-
discounting properties, including impatience and the present bias, tendencies which are 
stronger in “naifs” than “sophisticates” and also introduce the concept of “sign effect,” 
which shows that future losses are discounted at a lower rate than future gains.89  
Self-control and Willpower 
Picoeconomic theory is well positioned to explain issues of ambivalence, 
dissociation, self-control issues and regret that often plague addicted individuals. It is also 
partially supported by the biological view of addiction as a disorder of dopamine 
regulation whereas dopamine is responsible for user’s sense of time, as dopamine 
decreases reason and reduces perception of future costs; in this sense, biology lays a 
contributing factor in hyperbolic discounting, making the present desire more important. 
For example, dissociation, which can be explained a temporary reveal of preferences, can 
be so dramatic that it can change what the person acknowledges as his “self.” Competing 
“agents” or interests vie to become the dominant choices on the basis of changing values 
of rewards; a “future self” can become a potential obstacle when an individual 
acknowledges that she wants to stop a negative behavior in the “now.” According to 
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Ainslie’s view, people are often aware of their changing and conflicting temporal 
perspectives, which consequently, leads them to attempt self-control in order to suppress 
the future self and act strategically by incorporating pre-commitment mechanisms to the 
presently desired alternative (e.g. resolutions, rehab, repression, willpower, etc.) Ainslie 
also points out that because individuals have imperfect knowledge of their willpower, 
they must infer it from past choices. Something like a resolution works on people’s 
attempt to preserve their reputation as a way to deter possible lapses and weakness of 
will.90 . In Will as Intertemporal Bargaining article, Monterosso and Ainslie state that “if 
people are hyperbolic discounters, they can either impulsively squander long range 
resources or compulsively imprison themselves for fear of their impulses while still 
strictly maximizing their expected discounted utility at every moment.”91 Picoeconomic 
model mimics a game theory-like methodology, where intrapersonal interests come into 
conflict with one another; present self enters into bargaining with one’s future self and 
can enter a prisoner’s dilemma relationship among successive motivational states.92  In 
this context, willpower deters against each individual impulse by instilling an anxiety of 
setting precedents for numerous future impulses. Ainslie connects this view of personal 
rules and cooperation in the bargaining process to principles specified in Kant’s 
categorical imperative and Kohlberg’s highest stage of morality which can, superficially, 
define rationality. However, Ainslie further argues that willpower is an “awkward 
expedient, not the ultimate rationality” as it does not truly resolve the problem of 
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temporary preferences.93 While willpower can be viewed as one of the “most flexible and 
potentially the most powerful of the choice-stabilizing devices” it only formalizes 
internal conflict and may actually result in negative consequences such as 1) development 
of obsessive-compulsive tendencies 2) a small lapse can lead to total collapse of restraint 
and 3) rules may lead to misperception.94 All of these phenomena have been observed in 
a clinical addiction treatment setting. The concept of “multiple selves” in one individual 
certainly opposes the neoclassical view of an atomistic rational agent. Ambivalence, or 
pursuing a goal that an addict desires to stop, is factor that is difficult to explain via 
standard theory means. Homo economicus modeling cannot explain two “selves” within 
one individual; nor is there any room for homo economicus to be “enslaved” by his 
appetites: a rational agent cannot at the same time look forward and be apprehensive 
about a future behavior experiencing a “motivation conflict beyond an uncertainty about 
magnitudes.”95   
However, the “successive motivational states” approach based on hyperbolic 
modeling has some gaps. Some find that the model is overly qualitative as it simply 
describes behavior, but does not explain it.96 For example, Kent Bach points out that, for 
the most part, Ainslie presents a descriptive model of the interplay of motivations, but 
attempts to fit it under parameters of a normative model with the intention of showing 
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how to manage motivational interplay.97 Others have noted that while hyperbolic 
discount models are good at demonstrating specific contexts, they cannot be applicable to 
all situation as they cannot account for different contextual factors that influence person’s 
intertemporal preferences; there is significant and systematic variability in individual 
discounts rates dependent on the context, which implies that the model loses its predictive 
power; it is also “distant from cognitive processes that underlie decision making.”98 The 
model also does not provide a detailed explanation of the interplay of affect and 
cognition, or a person’s struggle between emotion and reason. The role of emotion in 
hindering the self-control process of the deliberative system, is not clearly explained by 
the model. An individual has a limited “willpower budget” can is influenced by cognitive 
load, ego depletion, loneliness and social exclusion, age, stress, blood sugar levels (in the 
base of unhealthy eating behavior), and sleep deprivation, among others.99 The 
hyperbolic model captures moment-by-moment preferences which cannot completely 
address second-order attitudes (a concept in philosophy which signifies that people 
realize that their values are disproportional to the strengths of their desires and may 
attempt to act on or else knowingly resist that realization when trying to apply to 
concepts of procrastination, pre-commitment and personal rule.100 The notion of 
“multiple selves” within the intertemporal choice framework is often supported, however 
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there is a flaw in attempting to describe this phenomenon purely relying on mathematical 
and graphical modeling. Additional clinical and neuroimaging studies (including 
neuroeconomic approach) are suggested to confirm the specific nature of the 
phenomenon in order to provide basis for its underlying mechanism.101 Viewing an 
individual as a population of “partially conflicting interests makes it easier to understand 
irrationality, however irrational thought process and action should not be viewed as a 
collection of errors.”102 Regardless, research that builds upon and explores the conception 
of multiple selves is necessary to make current behavioral models more complete. Ainslie 
himself agrees that for a subject as complex as addiction, “a unifying discipline will be 
indispensable;” however, he still insists that the only way this can be attained is if the 
economic community accepts that “discount curves from expected rewards to be 
hyperbolic.”103 
While this paper does not intend to delve into the philosophical foundations of 
choice, self and self-control, it is important to present a particular model that enhances 
Ainslie’s conception of conflicted multiple selves within an addicted individual. Mark 
White states that an essential problem of economic models of rational choice is lack of 
distinction between decision/judgement and action; action is a physical manifestation of 
an agent’s choice. According to White, philosophy and specifically the field of action 
theory, encounter a similar problem and this is why both disciplines have difficulty 
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explaining akrasia. White quotes R. Jay Wallace and his view of the standard model of 
choice in action theory as the “hydraulic conception,” which “pictures desires as vectors 
of force to which the persons perform;” a theory that “leaves no room for genuine 
deliberative agency” resulting in passive agents.104  The article further points out that it is 
people’s ability to choose to or not to act on our beliefs and desires is what defines 
rationality as opposed to the standard definition of strictly following one’s judgement 
based on desire and beliefs.105 While some view this human ability as a unique faculty of 
“will,” Ainslie presented the intrapersonal bargaining between selves to overcome the 
temporary preferences resulting from hyperbolic discounting as a version of “will”: “the 
will is created by the perception of impulse-related choices as precedents for similar 
choices in the future.”106 The standard economic theory cannot attempt to incorporate the 
conception of will since homo economicus cannot experience a weakness of will, since he 
has no will to be weak.107 White proposes an alternative model which incorporates the 
philosophical concept of “will” (as proposed by John Searle and R. Jay Wallace) into the 
model of economic decision-making: choice is depicted as action that is not logically 
derived from an agent’s desire or belief, but instead from her free choice; this choice 
cannot be modeled, as it is an act of free will and can be represented with a probability 
distribution representing character or strength of will. This modeling further elaborates on 
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Ainslie’s depiction of conflict of successive motivational states through a model of 
character change and can be specifically applied to the dynamic aspects of addiction. The 
model partially reconciles Rational Addiction model which stipulated that addiction is an 
agent’s rational choice and that stopping an addicting behavior is also a rational choice, 
but requires a strong will to accomplish.108 This resonates with Gene Heyman’s view of 
addiction as a choice, in which recovery from addiction requires a choice and significant 
motivation and willpower to accomplish. Incorporating these concepts may further take 
picoeconomic approach into an overtly qualitative direction, so disfavored by social 
scientists. However, this begs a rhetorical question: does every observable phenomenon 
necessarily need to be quantified?  
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Chapter Five: Concluding Comments 
 Social psychologist Kurt Lewin famously stated that “there is nothing so practical 
as a good theory,” which can be interpreted that if a given theory provides an accurate 
explanation of an observable phenomenon, it must be able to find useful applications in 
the real world.109     This paper intended to make a case that standard economic theory, 
which, unfortunately, primarily remains the foundation for the economic discipline, 
cannot justify its assumptions if compared to real-world phenomena. The paper 
specifically focused on addiction as a type of akratic behavior that is frequently 
encountered in society. While the definition of “rationality” varies across diverse areas of 
knowledge and inquiry, the version of neoclassical economic theory that postulates a 
behavior with time-consistent preferences and choices and utility maximization under 
availability of full information and cost minimization is too narrow and inconsistent with 
empirical evidence that demonstrates that people can act in a systematically erratic 
fashion while making choices that are the opposite of optimal, often shifting between 
short-term and long-term goals. The need for incorporation of psychology in economics 
is obvious.  Unfortunately, behavioral sciences, including psychology, have also fallen 
prey to narrowly defined parameters of their respective models and subsequent theories.  
Social sciences in general have been too focused on constructing mathematical and 
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statistical models as a means of depicting and predicting human behavior.  Addiction can 
be a highly destructive behavior that inflicts physical and psychological suffering upon 
the addict and those around him; however, being fully aware of these costs,    the addict 
still chooses to pursue the destructive option, even when fully aware of consequences.   
This akratic phenomenon is perplexing and lacks a clear and concise explanation by any 
of the existing theories, especially within the framework of the neoclassical conception of 
homo economicus and choice. We saw that the Rational Addiction theory cannot explain 
empirically supported fact that an addicted individual often exhibits ambivalence about 
her preferences and a desire for more self-control. Picoeconomic theory’s view of the self 
as a population of conflicted selves attempting to refrain from or succumbing to 
temptation is a promising area of further study which removes some of the limitations of 
the standard economic theory with evidence-based insights from psychology and 
elements of philosophical theories concerning self and willpower. I recognize that while 
the topic is vast and can be approached from a variety of vantage points, it is important to 
reiterate that human behavior is influenced by an immense number of factors that cannot 
always fit within a specific methodological framework in order for it to be capable of 
undergoing scientific scrutiny and analysis. Based on this limited overview and treatment 
of addiction, the following general conclusion can be reached: neoclassical economics 
and rational choice theories that stem from its foundations are unable to explain the 
highly complex and nuanced world of human behavior, particularly a behavior that is 
akratic in nature. The picoeconomic theory and its underlying principle of hyperbolic 
discounting and intertemporal bargaining among multiple selves, are capable of 
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providing some important insights and advantages over the standard economic theory. 
The theory integrates, albeit not fully, important considerations from psychological 
sciences and philosophy and demonstrate the obvious flaw in the “rational agent” 
assumption and neoclassical economics definition of rationality. Its base, nonetheless, 
continues the “scientific tradition” of attempting to quantify highly subjective aspects of 
human nature, including emotions, passions and thoughts. Currently, neither 
picoeconomics, nor any other prominent theoretical framework, are able to 
comprehensively address the phenomenon of addiction and answer why homo sapiens 
often acts against his own long-term self-interest. 
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